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INTRODUCTION 
“To say that customs have the force of laws in a country, where 
all the laws are written appears to us a contradiction.”1 
Who pays for the wedding reception—the bride’s parents or the 
newlyweds? Can a woman use her husband’s surname after a divorce? 
These might seem like etiquette questions for Miss Manners,2 but 
Louisiana courts have answered these questions by referring to custom,3 a 
primary source of law in Louisiana.4 These cases are rare, however; 
Louisiana courts usually reject a litigant’s attempt to invoke custom.5 
When the courts do mention custom, they often mean conventional usage, 
a secondary source of Louisiana law.6 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2019, by GAIL S. STEPHENSON. 
 * Louisiana Outside Counsel A.A. Lenoir Endowed Professor and Director 
of Legal Analysis & Writing at Southern University Law Center; J.D., Louisiana 
State University Paul M. Hebert Law Center 1984. Funding to support work on 
this Article was provided by a summer research stipend from Southern University 
Law Center, with special thanks to Chancellor John K. Pierre. I also thank SULC 
Director of Library Services Phebe Poydras and her amazing staff for their 
research assistance, as well as the participants at the Louisiana Scholarly 
Workshop 2018 at Loyola New Orleans for their helpful suggestions. 
 1. 1 LA. STATE LAW INST., LOUISIANA LEGAL ARCHIVES: A REPUBLICATION 
OF THE PROJET OF THE CIVIL CODE OF LOUISIANA OF 1825 (1937) (proposing 
suppression of article 3). 
 2. Judith Martin writes a newspaper column on etiquette under the name 
“Miss Manners”; she also writes books on etiquette. See, e.g., JUDITH MARTIN, 
MISS MANNERS ON WEDDINGS (1999). 
 3. See Int’l River Ctr. v. Kogos, 516 So. 2d 1327, 1329 (La. Ct. App. 1987) 
(bride testified it was “common custom for the parents of the bride to pay for the 
wedding reception”); Welcker v. Welcker, 342 So. 2d 251, 253 (La. Ct. App. 
1977) (divorced women are customarily “known by a combination of their 
Christian name, their family surname and their former husband's surname”). 
 4. Article 1 of the Louisiana Civil Code provides: “The sources of law are 
legislation and custom.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 1 (2019). The 1987 Revision 
Comments to article 1 state that “[a]ccording to civilian doctrine, legislation and 
custom are authoritative or primary sources of law.” LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1 
cmt. b (2019). 
 5. See, e.g., Perry v. Allied Offshore Marine Corp., 618 So. 2d 1033, 1036 
(La. Ct. App. 1993) (rejecting the alleged custom—a court’s long-standing 
practice of hearing maintenance and cure cases by summary process—as it 
violated Louisiana procedural law). 
 6. See, e.g., Terrell v. Alexandria Auto Co., 125 So. 757, 759 (La. Ct. App. 
1930) (in interpreting a contract of sale, the court referred to the business practice 
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Some commentators consider jurisprudence constante—“an 
interpretation of a rule of law that has been accepted and applied by the 
courts in repeated decisions in a long line of cases”7—to be custom and 
thus binding law, but most Louisiana courts have stated that jurisprudence, 
even jurisprudence constante, is instead a secondary source of law with 
only persuasive effect.8 
This Article explores the historical basis of consuetudinary law and 
the definition of custom, including its characteristics, its distinction from 
usage, and its relation to jurisprudence. This Article examines the 
Louisiana Civil Code’s treatment of custom and the legislative history of 
the 1987 revisions to the Louisiana Civil Code to determine what the 
Louisiana Legislature intended when it established custom as a primary 
source of law. The Article also surveys the Louisiana courts’ treatment of 
custom, including the courts’ confusion between custom and conventional 
usage and the requirements courts imposed to prove custom. Finally, the 
Article looks at the decline of custom as a primary source of law and 
attempts to determine whether customary law still exists in Louisiana. 
I. HISTORICAL TRADITION OF CUSTOMARY LAW 
Custom was the law of preliterate societies,9 “preserved in the memory 
of old men.”10 Custom has been described as an “ancient, but now very 
often foreign, source of law.”11 In the sixth century, custom was 
recognized in Emperor Justinian’s Digest.12 The Digest, or Pandect, was 
a compilation of classical legal texts from the first century B.C. to the 
fourth century A.D.;13 the Digest stated, “Custom of long standing is 
rightly regarded as law.”14 
                                                                                                             
of delivering a car by driving it from the dealership to the purchaser’s home as 
“the custom of the place”). 
 7. MARY GARVEY ALGERO, LOUISIANA LEGAL RESEARCH 8–9 (3d ed. 2017). 
 8. See, e.g., Delta Chem. Corp. v. Lynch, 979 So. 2d 579, 588 (La. Ct. App. 
2008). 
 9. DAVID J. BEDERMAN, CUSTOM AS A SOURCE OF LAW 3 (2010). 
 10. BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, 2 THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 251 (J.V. Prichard 
ed., Thomas Nugent trans., London, 1914). 
 11. Emily Kadens, Introduction: Lessons from the History of Custom, 48 
TEX. INT’L L.J. 349, 355 (2013). 
 12. R.H. Helmkolz, Christopher St. German and the Law of Custom, 70 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 129, 131 (2003). 
 13. A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW SYSTEM COURSE 
OUTLINES, Part 1, § 9, at 18 (1971). 
 14. Helmkolz, supra note 12. 
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Most early Roman and European law in the Middle Ages was 
customary.15 The customs—coutumes—were ultimately written down or, 
in some cases, enacted as legislation.16 In France in 1453, King Charles 
VII in the Ordinance of Montil-les-Tours called for French customs to be 
reduced to writing.17 This began to be accomplished once printed books 
became widely available in the late 15th century.18 The Coutume de 
Ponthieu, the “first definitive text of a coutume,” was published in 1495.19 
By the 16th century, most customary law in France was reduced to 
writing.20 Codifications of the 19th century diminished the role of 
unwritten custom in France as a subsidiary source of law.21 
The enacted custom “resist[ed] in many fields the invasion of Roman 
law,”22 but Roman law was used to fill gaps in the customary law in civil 
law countries.23 When Roman law and custom conflicted, however, 
custom prevailed.24 This “pan-European amalgam of inherited Roman 
law, the emerging canon law of the [Roman Catholic] Church, and pre-
existing customary regimes”—the ius commune—is “the cultural bridge 
of the Western legal tradition.”25 
Both civil and common law systems recognize customary law and 
acknowledge it as the source of modern law. John Selden, a 17th century 
English jurist and legal historian, noted “that all law originates, historically, 
in customary law.”26 One commentator noted that a “surprising degree of 
                                                                                                             
 15. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 13, § 33, at 89. 
 16. Id. 
 17. THOMAS GLYN WATKIN, AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO MODERN 
CIVIL LAW 122 (1999). 
 18. Id. 
 19. JEAN-GABRIEL CASTEL, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM OF THE PROVINCE OF 
QUÉBEC 37 (1962). 
 20. RENÉ DAVID, ENGLISH LAW AND FRENCH LAW 6 (1980). 
 21. Claire M. Germain, The French Legal System: Sources of Law, 
Authorities and Research Methods, in INTRODUCTION TO FOREIGN LEGAL 
SYSTEMS 57, 61 (Richard A. Danner & Marie-Louise H. Bernal eds., 1994). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id.; F.H. LAWSON, A COMMON LAWYER LOOKS AT THE CIVIL LAW 18 
(1955). 
 24. LAWSON, supra note 23, at 40.  
 25. BEDERMAN, supra note 9, at 22. 
 26. Harold J. Berman, The Origins of Historical Jurisprudence: Coke, Selden, 
Hale, 103 YALE L.J. 1651, 1700 (1994); see also BEDERMAN, supra note 9, at 3 (“All 
law begins with custom . . . .”). Not all commentators gave customary law the same 
respect, however. Jeremy Bentham, English philosopher and jurist, referred to 
customary law as “traditionary law” but “dismissed it. . . . as the law for ‘barbarians.’” 
Frederick Schauer, The Jurisprudence of Custom, 48 TEX. INT’L L.J. 523, 525 (2013) 
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commonality” exists in the treatment of customary law in the legal systems 
that developed in Europe.27 In his Commentaries on the Laws of England 
in 1765, William Blackstone noted that Roman law paid great regard to 
custom, but not as much as the common law; under Roman law, custom 
was adopted only when the written law was deficient.28 
II. DEFINITION OF CUSTOM 
Commentators and judges have struggled “to find a cogent and 
functional definition of custom”29 “since at least the twelfth century.”30 One 
writer noted that custom has “many different and concurrent meanings.”31 
Most codes do not define custom because definitions of sources of law are 
considered “a matter of legal science rather than legislation.”32 
An English law professor, Bernard S. Jackson, defined custom as “the 
unwritten body of norms of a group.”33 Another English writer defined it 
as “the unwritten law . . . of Romanistic origin which often serves the 
purpose of supplying any gaps there may be in the provisions of the 
codes.”34 French law professor François Gény described custom as “a 
complex of facts” that “reveal a legal sentiment.”35 A frequent description 
                                                                                                             
(quoting THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAN: OF THE LIMITS OF THE 
PENAL BRANCH OF JURISPRUDENCE 162 (Philip Schofield ed., 2010)). 
 27. See BEDERMAN, supra note 9, at 22. 
 28. See id. at 31 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
LAWS OF ENGLAND 73–74 (1765–69)). 
 29. Emily Kadens & Ernest A. Young, How Customary Is Customary 
International Law?, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 885, 906 (2013). 
 30. Kadens, supra note 11, at 349. 
 31. H.C. GUTTERIDGE, COMPARATIVE LAW 80 (1946). 
 32. A.N. Yiannopoulos, Jurisprudence and Doctrine as Sources of Law in 
Louisiana and in France, in THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND DOCTRINE IN 
CIVIL LAW AND IN MIXED JURISDICTIONS 69, 70 (Joseph Dainow ed., 1974); see 
also YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 13, § 33, at 90; Mack E. Barham, A Renaissance 
of the Civilian Tradition in Louisiana, in THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND 
DOCTRINE IN CIVIL LAW AND IN MIXED JURISDICTIONS 38, 45 (Joseph Dainow 
ed., 1974). 
 33. Bernard S. Jackson, Code and Custom, in CODES AND CUSTOMS: 
MILLENNIAL PERSPECTIVES 119, 119 (Roberta Kevelson ed., 1994). Jackson 
further described custom as “the internalisation of norms.” Id. at 120. 
 34. GUTTERIDGE, supra note 31. 
 35. FRANÇOIS GÉNY, MÉTHODE D’INTERPRÉTATION ET SOURCES EN DROIT 
PRIVÉ POSITIF § 110 (La. State Law Inst. trans., 2d ed. 1954). 
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of custom is “bottoms-up lawmaking”—law made “without the command 
of a single sovereign.”36 
Marcel Planiol defined custom as “law which has not been sanctioned 
by legislation. It consists of traditional rules established little by little in 
the course of time, and which are often difficult to ascertain.”37 Unlike 
most codes, the Louisiana Civil Code has always defined custom. From 
Louisiana’s first Civil Code in 1808 until its 1987 revision, article 3 read: 
“Customs result from a long series of actions constantly repeated, which 
have by such repetition, and by uninterrupted acquiescence, acquired the 
force of a tacit and common consent.”38 The current version of the Code 
states that “[c]ustom results from practice repeated for a long time and 
generally accepted as having acquired the force of law.”39 
A. Characteristics of Custom 
Custom’s key characteristics are “longevity, consistency, and 
widespread observance.”40 Professor Emily Kadens condenses these 
characteristics into two parts: “an objective requirement that an act be done 
repeatedly over time [the longevity and consistency factors], and a 
subjective requirement [known as the opinio juris] that the people 
engaging in the act do so out of a sense of legal obligation [the widespread 
observance factor].”41 The comments to Civil Code article 3 are in accord: 
“According to civilian theory, the two elements of custom are a long 
practice (longa consuetudo) and the conviction that the practice has the 
force of law (opinio necessitatis or opinio juris).”42 
                                                                                                             
 36. Kadens & Young, supra note 29, at 886–87; see also BEDERMAN, supra 
note 9, at x; Pascale Fournier & Pascal McDougall, False Jurisdictions? A 
Revisionist Take on Customary (Religious) Law in Germany, 48 TEX. INT’L L.J. 
435, 436 (2013). 
 37. MARCEL PLANIOL, TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL, Vol. 1, part 1, 
§ 3(11) 8–9 (La. State Law Inst. trans., 1959). 
 38. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3 (1885) (revised 1987). 
 39. Id. art. 3 (2019). 
 40. BEDERMAN, supra note 9, at 19. 
 41. Kadens, supra note 11, at 350. The common law concept of custom also 
requires a sense of legal obligation. As one commentator explained, “[T]he 
custom must, even prior to its formal recognition by the courts, have created in 
some people an obligation to conform.” Schauer, supra note 26, at 524. 
Furthermore, the “notion of custom arising out of a sense of legal 
obligation . . . has been specifically recognized as an attribute of customary 
international law.” David J. Bederman, The Curious Resurrection of Custom: 
Beach Access and Judicial Takings, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1375, 1451 (1996). 
 42. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3 cmt. b (2019). 
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Both the objective and subjective parts are necessary. Repeated 
behavior that the community does not consider legally binding is merely 
conventional usage.43 For example, standing for the national anthem and 
writing thank you notes are societal expectations.44 Failure to do these acts 
may earn social disapprobation,45 but no legal consequences result from 
their nonobservance.46 As Gény explained, the requirement of “color of 
necessity (opinio necessitatis)” “excludes from its scope certain social 
practices which may be firmly established, but which would claim in vain 
the character of a source of positive private law, for the usage on which 
they are based does not imply any coercive idea.”47 
Planiol stated that “there are controversies without end” regarding 
customary law’s authority and nature.48 Planiol himself believed custom 
could become an obligatory authority only after it had been “applied in 
adjudged cases”49 but acknowledged that “the majority of modern authors 
deny that customary law originates with the courts.”50 
French jurists are of three schools regarding what constitutes custom.51 
The first says that custom includes “practice, usages, received doctrine, 
and even the circumstances of social life.”52 The second “assimilates 
custom to usages of daily life, social, business, industrial, and agricultural, 
and even the rules of etiquette and moral and religious practices.”53 The 
third limits custom to case law.54 French law professor and Dean Yvon 
Loussouarn was of the opinion that the first was too broad, the second 
                                                                                                             
 43. Kadens, supra note 11, at 350. 
 44. Schauer, supra note 26, at 530. 
 45. See, e.g., Alex Altman & Sean Gregory, Trump’s Offensive Playbook, 
TIME, Oct. 9, 2017, at 33 (United States President Donald Trump referred to a 
National Football League player who knelt rather than stood for the national 
anthem as a “son of a bitch”). 
 46. For example, standing for the national anthem is not required by statute. 
See, e.g., 36 U.S.C. § 301(b)(1)(C) (2012) (during the national anthem, persons 
“should face the flag and stand at attention” (emphasis added)). No penalty 
attaches for failing to stand. 
 47. GÉNY, supra note 35, § 110. 
 48. PLANIOL, supra note 37, part 1, § 3 (No. 11) p. 9. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at n.6. Planiol denied the idea that a judge was bound to follow 
customary law, stating, “That is an English idea that has never been accepted in 
France.” Id. § 3 (No. 14) p. 12, n.10. 
 51. Yvon Loussouarn, The Relative Importance of Legislation, Custom, 
Doctrine, and Precedent in French Law, 18 LA. L. REV. 235, 247 (1958). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 247–48. 
 54. Id. at 248. 
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included usages that were not juridically binding and thus did not have the 
force of law, and the third was incorrect because judicial decisions are not 
binding in France.55 
B. Usage Distinguished from Custom 
Louisiana legislators apparently agreed with Loussouarn that none of 
the three French schools of thought were correct. The first two include 
usages, “a much broader, less-demanding concept than custom,”56 although 
even statutory texts often “improperly classif[y]” usages as custom.57 
Planiol stated that the nature of usages was “quite different from that of 
Custom.”58 He explained that when usages were adopted in contracts, they 
were “freely adopted,” as opposed to customs, which were “imposed upon 
them.”59 He further noted that “usages followed by individuals are 
absolutely without force” and that a “usage is merely a fact.”60 
Gény explained that usages include “all the manifestations of society 
which remain outside the positive legal order”—“the habits of daily life, . . . 
the mores of the people or of certain social classes, the commercial and other 
economic usages, the rules of civil behavior, the social conventions, or even 
moral and religious practices.”61 The lack of a coercive ideation, however, 
prevents them from becoming positive law.62 
The Louisiana Civil Code distinguishes custom from usage and 
specifically refers to usage in articles on interpretation of contracts,63 
explaining that a usage is “a practice regularly observed.”64 Article 4 
provides that the courts may resort to “justice, reason, and prevailing 
usages” in the absence of custom or legislation.65 
                                                                                                             
 55. Id. 
 56. David E. Pierce, Defining the Role of Industry Custom and Usage in Oil 
& Gas Litigation, 57 S.M.U. L. REV. 387, 390 (2004). 
 57. GÉNY, supra note 35, § 110. 
 58. PLANIOL, supra note 37, part 1, § 3 (No. 14) p. 11 n.8. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. § 3 (No. 11) p. 10 n.6. 
 61. GÉNY, supra note 35, § 110 (footnote omitted). 
 62. Id. 
 63. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1785, 2053–55 (2019). 
 64. Id. art. 2055. 
 65. Id. art. 4. This is similar to article 7 of the Civil Code of Puerto Rico, 
which provides: “When there is no statute applicable to the case at issue, the court 
shall decide in accordance with equity, which means that natural justice, as 
embodied in the general principles of jurisprudence and in accepted and 
established usages and customs, shall be taken into consideration.” P.R. LAWS 
ANN. tit. 31, § 7 (2018). 
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The comments to article 1 explain that legislation and custom, the 
primary sources of law, “are contrasted with persuasive or secondary 
sources of law, such as . . . conventional usages . . . that may guide the 
court in reaching a decision in the absence of legislation and custom.”66 
C. Jurisprudence Is Not Custom 
Louisiana legislators and judges have rejected the third school of 
thought—that judicial decisions are customary law. The comments to 
article 1 of the Civil Code explicitly state that jurisprudence is “persuasive 
or secondary” and that courts should use it only in the absence of 
legislation and custom.67 Louisiana courts have repeated this principle 
innumerable times,68 most recently in Justice John L. Weimer’s 
concurrence in Billeaudeau v. Opelousas General Hospital Authority, in 
which the court stated, “[J]urisprudence, even when it arises to the level 
of jurisprudence constante, is a secondary source of law.”69 
Some doctrinal writers, mostly those writing before the 1987 
amendment to the Civil Code, have opined that “a long line of decisions 
on a certain subject may be taken to establish rules of customary law” that 
courts must follow.70 In 1973, Professor William Thomas Tête asserted 
                                                                                                             
 66. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1 cmt. b (2019). 
 67. Id. 
 68. See, e.g., Doerr v. Mobil Oil Corp., 774 So. 2d 119, 128 (La. 2000); 
Ardoin v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 360 So. 2d 1331, 1334 (La. 1978) (“The 
case law is invaluable as previous interpretation of [a statute] . . . , but it is 
nevertheless secondary information.”); Royal v. Cook, 984 So. 2d 156, 163 (La. 
Ct. App. 2008). 
 69. Billeaudeau v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp. Auth., 218 So. 3d 513, 529 (La. 
2016) (Weimer, J., concurring) (quoting Alvin B. Rubin, Hazards of a Civilian 
Venturer in Federal Court: Travel and Travail on the Erie Railroad, 48 LA. L. 
REV. 1369, 1372 (1988)). 
 70. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 13, § 35, at 101; see also Mack E. Barham, 
Methodology of the Civil Law in Louisiana, 50 TUL. L. REV. 474, 484 (1976) 
(“[T]here also exists that jurisprudence which, through common usage, has 
become accepted as a source of law as custom.”); Robert A. Pascal & W. Thomas 
Tête, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1969-1970 Term: Law 
in General, 31 LA. L. REV. 185, 186 (1971) (“‘[A] long series’ of judicial 
decisions, ‘constantly repeated’ and enjoying ‘uninterrupted acquiescence’ by the 
people may evidence that ‘tacit and common consent’ of the people which is as 
generative of custom as the express consent of the whole people through their 
representatives is generative of legislation.”); Robert L. Henry, Jurisprudence 
Constante and Stare Decisis Contrasted, 15 A.B.A. J. 11 (1929) (“The Civil Law 
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that article 3 of the 1825 Civil Code was based on Spanish law, not French, 
and that the Spanish concept of custom “closely linked customary law and 
judicial decision.”71 Thus, he concluded that the courts’ repeated 
enforcement of a rule could create customary law.72 
Other commentators, however, agree with Justice Weimer’s assertions 
that jurisprudence constante does not create customary, binding law. For 
example, former Louisiana Supreme Court justice and current federal 
appellate judge James L. Dennis wrote, “Jurisprudence constante 
certainly does not represent legislative force in the proper sense, such as 
we attach to written law or custom.”73 
III. CIVIL CODE TREATMENT OF CUSTOM 
From the first version of the Louisiana Civil Code in 1808 until its 
1987 revision, article 1 read: “Law is a solemn expression of legislative 
will.”74 According to Professor Vernon Palmer, this article was seen as “a 
manifesto proclaiming that legislation is the only recognized source of law 
and, in relation to it, jurisprudence would have no or low value.”75 Article 
3 previously read: “Customs result from a long series of actions constantly 
repeated, which have by such repetition and by uninterrupted acquiescence 
acquired the force of a tacit and common consent.”76 
                                                                                                             
begins with the principle that precedents are not binding. Then it makes 
exceptions where the matter is jurisprudence constante.”). 
 71. William Thomas Tête, The Code, Custom, and the Courts: Notes Toward 
a Louisiana Theory of Precedent, 48 TUL. L. REV. 1, 7 (1973). 
 72. Id. at 1–2, 7, 12. 
 73. James L. Dennis, Interpretation and Application of the Civil Code and 
the Evaluation of Judicial Precedent, 54 LA. L. REV. 1, 15 (1993); see also MARY 
ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS 205 (1985) (“Some 
treatise writers have characterized settled case law as custom, but it is not 
officially recognized as such.”); WATKIN, supra note 17, at 8–9 (“[T]he recorded 
decisions of the courts in civil law countries . . . have considerable persuasive 
force . . . . The decisions of the courts are referred to as their jurisprudence, and 
this is regarded as a secondary source of law. . . . Court decisions however never 
amount to a justifying reason why the law should be applied or interpreted in a 
particular way.”). 
 74. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1 (1986) (revised 1987). 
 75. Vernon Valentine Palmer & Harry Borowski, Louisiana, in MIXED 
JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE 303 (Vernon Valentine Palmer ed., 2d ed. 2012). 
 76. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3 (1986) (revised 1987). 
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A. Civil Code Revision of 1987 
The preliminary title of the Louisiana Civil Code was revised in 1987. 
Article 1 now provides: “The sources of law are legislation and custom.”77 
The 1987 Revision Comments state that, “[a]ccording to civilian doctrine, 
legislation and custom are authoritative or primary sources of law.”78 The 
comments further state that “legislation is the superior source of law in 
Louisiana”;79 that “legislation is superior to any other source of law”;80 
and that a judge “may look for solutions elsewhere” only when the case is 
“not covered by legislation.”81 
The definition of custom in article 3 was changed in 1987. It now 
reads: “Custom results from practice repeated for a long time and generally 
accepted as having acquired the force of law.”82 The comments state that 
this definition “reproduces the substance” of the previous version and 
“does not change the law.”83 The revision added the following to article 3: 
“Custom may not abrogate legislation.”84 The comments reiterate that 
“[l]egislation and custom are primary sources of law,” but “legislation is 
the superior source of law in Louisiana.”85 
                                                                                                             
 77. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1 (2019). 
 78. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1 cmt. b (2019). 
 79. Id. cmt. a. 
 80. Id. cmt. c. 
 81. Id. Similarly, in Québec, legislation and custom are both considered 
primary law, with custom being considered a “‘subsidiary’ primary source of 
law.” F. Pearl Eliadis, The Legal System in Québec, in GERALD L. GALL, THE 
CANADIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 209, 219 (4th ed. 1995). The Civil Code of Québec 
states, in pertinent part: “[T]he Code is the foundation of all other laws, although 
other laws may complement the Code or make exceptions to it.” Civil Code of 
Québec, S.Q. 1991, Preliminary Provisions (Can.). 
 82. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3. 
 83. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3 cmt. a. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. cmt. d. 
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Although the comments to the Civil Code are not law,86 Louisiana 
courts consider comments to be “highly authoritative.”87 The Louisiana 
Supreme Court stated, “While the revision comments do not form part of 
the law, they were presented together with the proposed legislation and 
illuminate the understanding and intent of the legislators.”88 
Notably, jurisprudence constante is not mentioned in either article 1 
or 3, or in the comments to these articles, leaving the issue of whether 
jurisprudence constante can be considered custom—and thus primary 
law—open to interpretation. 
B. Louisiana Supreme Court’s Interpretation of Code Revisions 
After the 1987 revisions, the Louisiana Supreme Court’s first 
pronouncement on the issue of jurisprudence constante was in Doerr v. 
Mobil Oil Corp.89 Doerr contains several statements regarding the 
authority to be given jurisprudence. The court first stated: “Judicial 
decisions . . . are not intended to be an authoritative source of law in 
Louisiana.”90 The court then quoted a law review article by Judge Dennis: 
“Under the civilian tradition, . . . jurisprudence constante . . . operates with 
‘considerable persuasive authority.’”91 The court concluded that “it is only 
when courts consistently recognize a long-standing rule of law outside of 
legislative expression that the rule of law will become part of Louisiana’s 
                                                                                                             
 86. H.R. Con. Res. 58, 1978 Leg., 4th Reg. Sess. (La. 1978); Louisiana Senate 
Rules of Order, Joint Rule of Order of the Senate and House of Representatives No. 
10, La. State Legislature, LA. ST. SENATE, http://senate.la.gov/Documents/ 
Rules/Joint.htm#10 [https://perma.cc/2JV5-RU3E] (last visited Apr. 2, 2019). The 
enacting legislation for the revisions to the Preliminary Title, including articles 1–
4, states that the “comments in this Act are not a part of the law and are not enacted 
into law by virtue of their inclusion in this Act.” 1987 La. Acts, § 3. 
 87. Melissa T. Lonegrass, Hidden Law: Taking the Comments More 
Seriously, 92 TUL L. REV. 265, 296 (2017). 
 88. Wartelle v. Women’s & Children’s Hosp., Inc., 704 So. 2d 778, 783 (La. 
1997). Professor Melissa Lonegrass described the comments to the Preliminary 
Title of the Code, and specifically articles 1–4, as comments that “do much more 
than simply contextualize the law. . . . [c]omments of this sort act as gap-fillers, 
suggesting solutions to legal problems that did not make their way into the text 
and making explicit various connections to which the text points only implicitly, 
if at all.” Lonegrass, supra note 87, at 310. 
 89. Doerr v. Mobil Oil Corp., 774 So. 2d 119 (La. 2000). 
 90. Id. at 128. 
 91. Id. (citing Dennis, supra note 73, at 15). Dennis’s statement is supported 
in the literature. See, e.g., WATKIN, supra note 17, at 8 (“[T]he recorded decisions 
of the courts in civil law countries . . . have considerable persuasive force . . . .”). 
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custom under Civil Code article 3 and be enforced as the law of the 
state.”92 
The court’s language regarding jurisprudence constante is confusing. 
If the Louisiana Supreme Court meant jurisprudence constante when it 
referred to “a long-standing rule outside of legislative expression,”93 the 
court’s concluding statement conflicts with its statement that 
jurisprudence constante has “considerable persuasive authority.”94 Law 
that is primary and authoritative is binding; law that is secondary and 
persuasive is not.95 Thus, jurisprudence constante cannot be both a “highly 
persuasive” secondary source, and custom, a primary source that can “be 
enforced as the law of the state.” 
In the 2005 decision Willis-Knighton Medical Center v. Caddo 
Shreveport Sales & Use Tax Commission,96 Justice Weimer adopted 
Justice Dennis’s view that jurisprudence constante is a secondary, 
nonbinding source of law, stating: “Jurisprudence constante carries 
‘considerable persuasive authority,’ but is not the law.”97 He further stated: 
“Jurisprudence constante, as this court recognized in Doerr, is only 
‘persuasive authority.’”98 Again, in the 2015 case Kelly v. State Farm Fire 
& Casualty Co.,99 Weimer stated that “legislation is a primary source of 
law and jurisprudence constante is a secondary source of law.”100 
Only one Louisiana intermediate appellate court has quoted Doerr’s 
language regarding “a long-standing rule of law outside of legislative 
expression” becoming custom, and thus authoritative law. Judge Amy of 
the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal used Doerr’s language in a 
dissent in a way that seemed to refer to jurisprudence constante. The judge 
found that the two recent cases the plaintiff cited were not “controlling,” 
implying he was not bound to follow them because the cases did not form 
a long-standing rule of law.101 
                                                                                                             
 92. Doerr, 774 So. 2d at 129. 
 93. Id. at 129. 
 94. Id. at 128 (citing Dennis, supra note 73, at 15). 
 95. See, e.g., ALGERO, supra note 7, at 6; CHARLES R. CALLEROS, LEGAL 
METHOD AND WRITING 78–79 (2006); MICHAEL D. MURRAY & CHRISTY HALLAM 
DESANCTIS, LEGAL RESEARCH AND WRITING 2–3 (2005). 
 96. Willis-Knighton Med. Ctr. v. Caddo Shreveport Sales & Use Tax 
Comm’n, 903 So. 2d 1071, 1087 (La. 2005) (internal citations omitted). 
 97. Id. at 1088 (internal citations omitted). 
 98. Id. at 1106 (Weimer, J., assigning additional reasons).  
 99. Kelly v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 169 So. 3d 328, 338 (La. 2015). 
 100. Id. 
 101. See Aguillard v. Auction Mgmt. Corp., 884 So. 2d 1257, 1262–63 (La. 
Ct. App. 2004) (Amy, J., dissenting), rev’d, 908 So. 2d 1 (La. 2005). 
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C. Legislative History of 1987 Revision 
A review of legislative history reveals that Justice Weimer’s repeated 
statements that jurisprudence constante is only a secondary source of law 
are correct. When the legislature revised the Preliminary Title of the 
Louisiana Civil Code in 1987 and reenacted articles 1 and 3, it intended 
that jurisprudence, and even case law that rises to the level of 
jurisprudence constante, be only secondary, persuasive, nonbinding law. 
The Louisiana State Law Institute drafted the revisions.102 The 
Preliminary Title Committee met on November 1, 1985;103 December 6, 
1985;104 and February 6, 1987.105 The full Council met on February 14, 
1986;106 February 27, 1987;107 and March 20, 1987.108 Before these 
meetings, the reporter, Professor A.N. Yiannopoulos, prepared background 
materials for the other members, including excerpts from his book 
Louisiana Civil Law System,109 and from the 1959 translation of Marcel 
Planiol’s French treatise on the civil law.110 Both Yiannopoulos’s book 
and Planiol’s treatise were used as textbooks in Louisiana and French law 
schools, respectively. The materials the Law Institute provided for the first 
two meetings included language regarding custom from Yiannopoulos’s 
book: “[C]ivilian scholars in France have developed conflicting theories 
as to the nature and effects of customs. . . . According to a third view, 
customs derive exclusively from case law. This view must be rejected 
because judges have no legislative authority.”111 
Interestingly, the background materials did not include the section 
from Yiannopoulos’s book that stated: 
The theory that judicial precedents are not a source of law admits 
an apparent exception. In Louisiana and in France, a long line of 
                                                                                                             
 102. The Louisiana State Law Institute was established by the Louisiana 
Legislature in 1938 “to promote and encourage the clarification of the law of 
Louisiana and its better adaptation to present social needs, to secure the better 
administration of justice and to carry out scholarly research and scientific work.” 
Act No. 166, 1938 La. Acts 429. 
 103. Minutes, La. State Law Institute Preliminary Title Comm. (Nov. 1, 1985). 
 104. Minutes, La. State Law Institute Preliminary Title Comm. (Dec. 6, 1985). 
 105. Minutes, La. State Law Institute Preliminary Title Comm. (Feb. 6, 1987). 
 106. Minutes, La. State Law Inst. Council (Feb. 14, 1986). 
 107. Minutes, La. State Law Inst. Council (Feb. 27, 1987). 
 108. Minutes, La. State Law Inst. Council (Mar. 20, 1987). 
 109. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 13. 
 110. PLANIOL, supra note 37. 
 111. A.N. Yiannopoulos, Materials for Meetings of Nov. 1, 1985 and Dec. 6, 
1985 (quoting YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 13, § 33). 
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decisions on a certain subject may be taken to establish rules of 
customary law. This is the doctrine of “settled jurisprudence” 
(jurisprudence constante). Courts must follow this jurisprudence as 
customary law rather than as merely precedents. In France, this 
exception rests on doctrinal considerations; in Louisiana, there is 
legislative foundation for it in Articles 3 and 21 of the Civil Code.112 
In the December 1985 meeting, the Committee members discussed 
whether jurisprudence could be a primary source of law. Two of the 
members worried that the new language of article 1, stating that legislation 
and custom were “[t]he sources of law,” “would mean that one could 
interpret the article as allowing the use of doctrine and jurisprudence as 
sources of law. They did not want this result.”113 Yiannopoulos “argued that 
a tradition of Louisiana was that jurisprudence was not a source of law. He 
explained that his comments explained that jurisprudence was a ‘secondary’ 
source of law and distinguishable from a ‘primary’ source of law.”114 
The Committee then considered deleting articles 1–3, but Professor 
Katherine Spaht “urged the Committee to retain the articles, since they 
were used to emphasize that there was no judge-made law. She argued that 
the legislature would oppose the absence of those articles.”115 In that 
meeting, the Committee also amended the proposed language of article 3 
“to clarify that custom resulted from a practice by the people and not by 
the courts.”116 
When the Council met to discuss the recommendations of the 
committee,117 Yiannopoulos began by explaining that the language of 
                                                                                                             
 112. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 13, § 35, at 101 (emphasis added). Articles 3 
and 21, referred to in the quotation, are the articles from the original version of 
the Louisiana Civil Code in effect from 1808 to 1986, concerning custom and 
usages. Article 3 provided: “Customs result from a long series of actions 
constantly repeated, which have by such repetition and by uninterrupted 
acquiescence acquired the force of a tacit and common consent.” LA. CIV. CODE 
art. 3 (1986) (revised 1987). Article 21 provided: “In all civil matters, where there 
is no express laws, the judge is bound to proceed and decide according to equity. 
To decide equitably an appeal is to be made to natural law and reason, or received 
usages, where positive law is silent.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 21 (1986), superseded 
by LA. CIV. CODE art. 4 (2019). 
 113. Minutes, La. State Law Institute Preliminary Title Comm., p. 2 (Dec. 6, 
1985). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at p. 3. 
 117. For a description of the process followed by the Louisiana State Law 
Institute, see Lonegrass, supra note 87, at 278–79. 
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former article 1—“Law is a solemn expression of legislative will”—“was 
part of Louisiana tradition and was used by our courts as authority for the 
principle that judge-made-law was not law.”118 Some Council members 
argued that under the Louisiana Constitution, only the legislature could 
make laws.119 The Council temporarily adopted a motion indicating that 
custom was a secondary source of law,120 but ultimately acceded to the 
comment to article 1 that both legislation and custom were primary 
sources. During all of the meetings, however, custom was referred to as 
law created by the people, and the possibility that jurisprudence could rise 
to the level of custom as jurisprudence constante was never discussed. 
The language of articles 1 and 3 as drafted by the Law Institute was 
submitted as House Bill number 1136.121 The bill was reported favorably 
by the House Committee on Civil Law and Procedure on May 13, 1987,122 
and was passed unanimously on May 15, 1987, as Act number 124, exactly 
as drafted.123 
IV. LOUISIANA COURTS’ TREATMENT OF CUSTOM 
As noted at the outset, Louisiana cases applying custom are rare. Often 
what the court calls custom is actually usage. Some attempts to use custom 
are rejected for lack of proof; others are rejected because the asserted 
custom is contrary to legislation or the contract between the parties. And 
the facts that gave rise to the rare cases decided using custom in the last 
century would probably not recur today. 
A. Usage Cases 
Despite the clear distinction between custom and usage in the Civil 
Code, Louisiana courts tend to confuse and conflate the terms,124 probably 
because of the lingering questions regarding what constitutes custom.125 
                                                                                                             
 118. Minutes, La. State Law Inst. Council, p. 1 (Feb. 14, 1986). 
 119. Id. at p. 2. 
 120. Id. 
 121. H.B. 1136, 13th Sess. (La. 1987) (enacted). 
 122. H. REP. JOURNAL, 13th Sess. 472 (La. 1987). 
 123. Id. at 563. 
 124. See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 13, § 33, at 94. 
 125. Lingering questions, such as the length of time required for a practice to 
become a custom and the percentage of people who have to believe they are bound 
for a practice to become “generally accepted as having acquired the force of law,” 
as required by Louisiana Civil Code article 3, are beyond the scope of this Article. 
See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3 (2019). 
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Thus, courts either refer to “custom or usage,” without attempting to 
determine which actually applies in a particular case,126 or courts refer to 
something as custom that can be only usage. For example, in the case 
regarding payment for the wedding reception, the court noted the bride’s 
testimony “that it is common custom for the parents of the bride to pay for 
the wedding reception.”127 Instead of relying on custom as a primary 
source of law, the court affirmed the judgment dismissing the bride from 
the lawsuit by stating that “in the absence of express law, common custom 
or received usages are examined in an appeal to equity.”128 
Similarly, in the case of the ex-wife who wanted to continue to use her 
former husband’s surname, the court stated that it could “look to 
established custom and equity for assistance in deciding” the case.129 The 
court noted Planiol’s writings that a woman had no right to use her 
husband’s name after a divorce. The court also took judicial notice of “the 
generally existent custom under which divorced women are known by a 
combination of their Christian name, their family surname, and their 
former husband's surname,”130 and recognized the right of a woman to 
revert to her maiden name after divorce.131 The court concluded that in 
“modern life,” divorce had “provoked the establishment of its own 
customs,” including the “generally acknowledged acceptability of the use 
of the husband’s surname by his former spouse.”132 Accordingly, a 
divorced woman can use her maiden name or her husband’s surname. 
Without a widespread sense that she is legally required to do one or the 
other, however, only a usage has been shown, not a custom. Thus, although 
the court stated it was using “established custom and equity” to decide the 
case, the court actually applied a usage.  
                                                                                                             
 126. See, e.g., Hurst v. Ricard, 514 So. 2d 14, 16 (La. 1987) (“[I]t was a custom 
or usage to divide chenal frontage into tapered tracts closing rearward.”); People’s 
Bank & Trust Co. v. La. State Rice Milling Co., 119 So. 779, 780 (La. Ct. App. 
1929) (“Such a custom or usage had the force of law between the parties . . . .”). 
 127. Int’l River Ctr. v. Kogos, 516 So. 2d 1327, 1329 (La. Ct. App. 1987). 
 128. Id. (emphasis added). Under the Louisiana Civil Code, equity is the 
application of “justice, reason, and prevailing usages” when no positive law 
exists. LA. CIV. CODE art. 4. As no statute answered the question before the court, 
the court decided the case by looking at what was usually done by people in 
similar situations.  
 129. Welcker v. Welcker, 342 So. 2d 251, 253 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (emphasis 
added). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. (citing Wilty v. Jefferson Par. Democratic Exec. Comm., 157 So. 2d 
718 (La. 1963)); Succession of Kneipt, 134 So. 376 (La. 1931). 
 132. Welcker, 342 So. 2d at 254. 
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B. Proof of Custom 
French courts in the 18th century required proof of custom through 
inquests, called turba, of at least ten local persons who were “thought 
likely to know or remember” the customary law.133 Proof of the custom 
required that ten people agree to the existence of the custom for it to be 
binding.134 Later, the number increased to 20 as two turba were 
required.135 
Louisiana law did not adopt any specific requirements for proof of 
custom. While the jurisprudence is unclear as to the burden of proof of 
custom, courts tend to reject assertions of custom due to insufficient proof. 
One of the first cases regarding proof of custom arose in 1834 in Broussard 
v. Bernard, when an heir attempted to prove through parol evidence certain 
customs regarding community property law and “that the Fuero Real of 
the kingdom of Spain, was in force, where the succession was opened.”136 
The court found that parol evidence could not prove custom, stating that 
“[t]he recognition of customs, by our Code, necessarily admitted proof, 
other than that required to establish laws.”137 The court, however, 
remanded the case for the introduction of certain documentary evidence 
that the trial judge originally rejected.138 
Similarly, in 1841, the court rejected a claim by a ship’s captain that 
he was entitled to a certain commission on freight according to “the usage 
and custom of merchants in New Orleans.”139 The court held the evidence 
of the custom was insufficient, stating that “when a custom is relied on, it 
must be established by evidence, the private knowledge of the jury will 
not authorize a verdict without the proof . . . and custom cannot be 
regarded as law until a long and uninterrupted prevalence is proved.”140 
In 1917, an attorney—who had given up his legal practice in favor of 
real-estate investing—attempted to avoid paying a fee to another attorney 
who had worked on his case for six years, citing the “custom of courtesy,” 
i.e., members of one profession did not charge others in the same 
profession.141 A dozen practitioners and judges were called to testify, and 
the court concluded that the plaintiff had failed to prove a binding legal 
                                                                                                             
 133. WATKIN, supra note 17, at 101. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Broussard v. Bernard, 7 La. 211, 215 (1834). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 215–16. 
 139. Tyson v. Laidlaw, 18 La. 380, 381 (1841). 
 140. Id. at 382 (citations omitted). 
 141. Thigpen & Herold v. Slattery, 73 So. 780, 782 (La. 1917). 
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custom; most of the witnesses followed the rule, but the witnesses believed 
the rule could be disregarded under the right circumstances.142 The court 
added, however, that “a case might, perhaps, be presented in which that 
rule would be applied as the law which should govern it.”143 
In a recent case involving a dispute between two municipalities and 
the parish police jury over who was responsible for paying the pre-
adjudicative expenses for housing juveniles the municipalities arrested, 
the court relied on Bernard.144 The towns claimed that the police jury had 
paid the expenses in the past and that this “custom and practice” was 
sufficient to obligate the police jury to pay in this situation as well.145 
Without explaining what proof was necessary, the court rejected the 
custom argument due to insufficient evidence, stating that the 
jurisprudence regarding proof of custom has “remained unchallenged” 
since Bernard.146 
An odd example of proof of custom is found in the wedding reception 
case. The plaintiff in that case—the reception hall—initially sued only the 
bride and later added her parents as defendants.147 Despite provisions in 
the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure that allow a plaintiff to amend the 
petition to add further defendants,148 the court stated that the plaintiff had 
“tacitly acknowledged” the custom that the bride’s family pays for the 
reception when it initially sued the bride and not the groom. The court 
found the tacit acknowledgment was sufficient proof of this “common 
custom.”149 
One clear tenet regarding proof of custom is that the party seeking to 
invoke a custom must prove that both parties were aware of the rule sought 
to be declared custom.150 The decisions establishing this tenet are logical, 
as the parties must be under the conviction that the rule has the force of 
law—which is difficult to show when one party is unaware of the rule. If 
                                                                                                             
 142. Id. at 782–83. 
 143. Id. at 783. 
 144. City of Abbeville v. Vermilion Par. Police Jury, 85 So. 3d 233, 236–37 
(La. Ct. App. 2012). 
 145. Id. at 236. 
 146. Id. at 237; id. (Painter, J., dissenting) (stating that the police jury’s 
pleadings were insufficient to establish custom).  
 147. Int’l River Ctr. v. Kogos, 516 So. 2d 1327, 1328 (La. Ct. App. 1987). 
 148. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 1151 (2019). 
 149. Kogos, 516 So. 2d at 1329. 
 150. See, e.g., Lewis v. The Ship “Success,” 18 La. Ann. 1 (La. 1866) (quoting 
Parrott v. Thacher, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 426, 438 (1830) (miscited by the court as 
“Pratt v. Thatcher, 9 Peck”)); see also Hirsch v. N.H. Fire Ins. Co. of Manchester, 
1 Teiss. 215, 219 (La. Ct. App. 1904). 
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the parties are residents of the same area and one does not know of the 
rule, the rule does not meet the “widespread observance” requirement.151 
As the Louisiana Supreme Court stated, “When . . . the question is of a 
custom or usage, and it is not known to those who, from business and 
connections, have the best means of knowing it, the ignorance of it is, in 
some sense, positive testimony of its non-existence.”152 
Furthermore, a rule that is widely known within an area cannot be 
applied as customary law to a non-resident who is unaware of the rule.153 
For example, in 1909, a theater company offered an actor an employment 
contract “‘for the season’” but fired him after giving two weeks’ notice.154 
The defendant testified that all employment contracts, “in theatrical 
parlance, carry two weeks’ notice on either side.”155 The actor, however, 
who was from Columbus, Ohio, testified he had never heard of the 
custom.156 The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s 
decision to exclude evidence of the so-called custom, stating: “The usage 
of a particular place or a particular class of persons cannot be binding on 
non-residents or on any person, unless they are shown to have been 
cognizant of it.”157 
Requiring proof that both parties knew of the custom seems to conflict 
with “the legal maxims that ‘all are presumed to know the law’ and that 
‘ignorance of the law is no excuse,’”158 which are codified in Louisiana 
Civil Code article 5.159 These maxims, which arise out of Roman civil 
law,160 are “founded upon considerations of public policy and necessity 
[and] should be adhered to in most instances.”161 The presumption that all 
people know the law, however, is legally sound only when the law is 
“certain and capable of being ascertained.”162 Although Roman law at the 
time of the Digest was largely based on custom, it was “definite and 
                                                                                                             
 151. See supra notes 90–92 and accompanying text. 
 152. Lewis, 18 La. Ann. at 6. 
 153. See Hirsch, 1 Teiss. at 219. 
 154. Camp v. Baldwin-Mellville Co., 48 So. 927, 930 (La. 1909). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Hirsch, 1 Teiss. at 219. 
 158. Cruze v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 184 So. 735, 738 (La. Ct. App. 1938); see 
also Gaspard v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 243 So. 2d 839, 842 (La. Ct. App. 1971). 
 159. LA. CIV. CODE art. 5 (2019) (“No one may avail himself of ignorance of 
the law.”). 
 160. Sharon L. Davies, The Jurisprudence of Willfulness: An Evolving Theory 
of Excusable Ignorance, 48 DUKE L.J. 341, 350 (1998). 
 161. Cruze, 184 So. at 738–39. 
 162. Edwin R. Keedy, Ignorance and Mistake in the Criminal Law, 22 HARV. 
L. REV. 75, 76 n.1 (1908). 
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knowable” because it was “well integrated with the community mores of 
the time.”163 Modern statutory law is made definite and knowable through 
enactment and publication of notice;164 after the promulgation of a law, 
each person is charged with knowledge of the law.165 As custom is not 
made public in this manner, the application of customary law to persons 
who have no notice of the law does not comport with modern notions of 
due process.166 
C. Custom Cannot Abrogate Legislation 
Even before the 1987 revision to article 3—explicitly stating that 
custom cannot abrogate legislation—Louisiana courts adopted the 
principle that custom could trump neither legislation nor the contract 
between the parties.167 One of the earliest cases arose in 1832, when a 
plaintiff demanded rescission of an entire sale of 401 coils of bale rope, 
when only some of the rope was of unmerchantable quality.168 The law 
was clear that he was entitled to return only the bad rope and not all of it. 
Plaintiff asserted, however, that “a custom, or commercial usage in New 
Orleans,” authorized return of the whole parcel if part of the order was 
defective.169 The court held: “[W]here the law is express, no man or set of 
men can create a custom for their own benefit or convenience, and give to 
that custom a force paramount to that of the law.”170 
The same principle was applied 150 years later when the defendants 
asserted that a savings and loan’s (“the S&L”) practice of permitting sales 
with assumption of the previous owner’s mortgage prevented the company 
from enforcing the “due-on-sale” clause in the defendants’ mortgage.171 
                                                                                                             
 163. Davies, supra note 160, at 350 n.38. 
 164. See Fields v. State, 714 So. 2d 1244, 1259 (La. 1998). 
 165. Succession of Young, 732 So. 2d 833, 836 (La. Ct. App. 1999). 
166.  See Fields, 714 So. 2d at 1250. The Supreme Court held that the Due 
Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution requires “that deprivation of life, liberty 
or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing 
appropriate to the nature of the case.” Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Tr. 
Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). The Court further held that although the rule that 
“ignorance of the law is no excuse” is deeply ingrained in our law, the requirement 
of notice under the Due Process Clause limits the exercise of that rule. Lambert 
v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957). 
 167. See, e.g., Clement v. S. Atl. S.S. Line, 54 So. 920, 921 (La. 1911). 
 168. Ledoux v. Armour, 4 Rob. 381, 381–82 (La. 1832). 
 169. Id. at 385. 
 170. Id. 
 171. La. Sav. Ass’n v. Trahan, 415 So. 2d 592, 596 (La. Ct. App. 1982). A 
due-on-sale clause is a contract provision in a mortgage that “authorizes a lender, 
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The defendants’ home was financed by the S&L’s mortgage.172 The 
mortgage contained a due-on-sale clause that required the company’s 
consent to a sale with assumption of mortgage, which would transfer the 
obligations under the mortgage to any subsequent purchaser of the 
home.173 When the defendants executed a sale with assumption without 
the S&L’s consent, the S&L foreclosed.174 
The court rejected the defendants’ argument that the S&L’s prior 
practice of permitting sales with assumption created a custom.175 The court 
found there was both an express contractual provision and an express 
Louisiana statute permitting the enforcement of the due-on-sale clause.176 
The court stated, “Jurisprudence construing Civil Code Article 3 has 
established the rule that neither ‘custom’ nor ‘usage’ nor ‘practice’ may 
prevent the enforcement of an express statutory provision.”177 
D. True Custom Cases 
It is necessary to go back to the early 20th century to find cases of true 
custom. One such case, from 1927, involved the question of whether an 
estate was responsible for the cost of the decedent’s headstone.178 The 
decedent’s sister had ordered the grave marker, but she subsequently 
opposed payment by the estate in the estate’s final accounting and 
homologation.179 The court denied her opposition, citing Civil Code article 
3 and stating: “The expenditure of a reasonable sum out of the estate of a 
party who has died for the purpose of marking his grave is authorized by 
a custom, so long existing that it has acquired the force and effect of a 
law.”180 
Another case in which the court applied custom with the force of law 
arose in 1935. This case involved an overseer of a large cotton plantation 
                                                                                                             
at its option, to declare due and payable sums secured by the lender’s security 
instrument if all or any part of the property, or an interest therein, securing the 
real property loan is sold or transferred without the lender’s prior written consent.” 
12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(a)(1) (2012).  
 172. Trahan, 415 So. 2d at 593. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 596. 
 176. Id.  
 177. Id. 
 178. Succession of Dunn, 6 La. App. 663, 664 (1927). 
 179. Id. at 666. 
 180. Id. 
2019] CUSTOM AS A SOURCE OF LAW IN LOUISIANA 1067 
 
 
 
who was fired in August despite being hired for “the year.”181 The court 
stated that the rule that overseers were hired for the calendar year was so 
well known that a court could take judicial notice of the custom “without 
allegation or proof.”182 
Today it is difficult to imagine a headstone being sold or a manager 
being employed for a large agricultural holding without a written 
agreement; for this reason, cases of this nature are unlikely to arise again. 
V. MODERN DIMINISHMENT OF CUSTOM 
Although most civil law systems today accept custom as a source of 
law, the importance of custom has declined in modern legal systems.183 In 
fact, John Henry Merryman commented in 1969 that the “amount of 
writing on custom as law in civil law jurisdictions is immense, far out of 
proportion to its actual importance as law. . . . [T]he importance of custom 
as a source of law is slight and decreasing.”184 Custom fills the lacunae in 
the statutes, but Louisiana Supreme Court Justice Mack Barham 
commented in 1974 that the historical meaning of custom “is not 
applicable in modern society as frequently as it was when our code was 
adopted.”185 
A 1962 law review article written by Albert Tate, Jr. is an indication 
of the diminished status of customary law.186 Tate, a state appellate judge 
who would go on to serve on the Louisiana Supreme Court, stated the 
“principal formal sources used by a Louisiana judge” were the Civil Code 
and the statutes, doctrine, and precedent.187 Tate’s only mention of custom 
was in a footnote, wherein he stated he was omitting discussion of custom 
because it was “used with relative infrequency in deciding civil litigation 
in our state courts.”188 
                                                                                                             
 181. Fletcher v. Crichton, 164 So. 411, 412 (La. 1935). 
 182. Id. at 413. 
 183. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 13, § 33, at 89. 
 184. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 24–25 (1969).  
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Custom has declined in importance for three primary reasons: (1) a 
strong legislature; (2) a more diverse population; and (3) our ever-
changing modern society.189 As Gény explained in 1899, “[A]s social 
relations become more complex, as ethnical groups fuse, and as the 
national aspirations are changed under the influence of cosmopolitism 
which makes a strong political centralization necessary, the force of 
customary law recedes in the face of the constantly growing role of written 
legislation.”190 Yiannopoulos stated that customary law flourishes when 
there is “no central power sufficiently strong to make new laws and to 
enforce obedience to the old,” but declines “[d]uring periods of strength 
and of good organization.” According to Yiannopoulos, this explains 
custom’s decline in importance.191 Louisiana currently has a strong 
legislature with power to make new laws and enforce old ones, and thus 
application of customary law is unnecessary. 
Customary law is strongest as a source of law in “small and closely 
knit communities, which often do not share the modern needs for fixed 
laws.”192 Louisiana now has almost 4.7 million people193 of many races,194 
ethnicities, cultures,195 and religions.196 It is difficult to imagine an 
uncodified practice that all, or even most, Louisiana citizens believe to be 
a binding legal obligation. The “custom” Yiannopoulos gave as an 
example during the Law Institute meetings—a wife taking her husband’s 
                                                                                                             
 189. See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 13, § 33, at 89. 
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 191. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 13, § 33, at 89; see also PLANIOL, supra note 
37, § 3(13) 11. 
 192. Kadens & Young, supra note 29, at 899. 
 193. Louisiana’s population in 2016 was 4,682,000. PROQUEST STATISTICAL 
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 2018 23 (6th ed. 2018). 
 194. In 2016 Louisiana was 61.2% white, 4.3% Hispanic, 31.2% black, 0.6% 
American Indian, 1.6% Asian, and 1.1% other. ANGIE SWANSON, LOUISIANA 16 
(Jaclyn Jaycox ed., 2017). 
 195. “The rich diversities in the land, people, and culture of Louisiana are 
matters of common knowledge. They have been celebrated in song and story. 
Many of these are deeply rooted in history.” Nomey v. State, 315 So. 2d 709, 716 
(La. 1975) (Sanders, C.J., dissenting); see also SWANSON, supra note 194 
(“Louisiana is a land of many cultures. French, British, Spanish, Haitian, and 
African ancestors created a special culture in Louisiana.”); Erin Ashley 
Hammons, I Spy Something Useful: The Short Life and Senseless Death of 
Louisiana Senate Bill 250, 43 S.U. L. REV. 355, 355 (2016) (“Louisiana [is] one 
of the most . . . culture-rich states in the nation.”). 
 196. See PROQUEST STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 2018, 
supra note 193, at 59. 
2019] CUSTOM AS A SOURCE OF LAW IN LOUISIANA 1069 
 
 
 
name upon marriage—was not considered a binding legal obligation in 
1987 by most people and is certainly not considered binding today.197 
Sixty years ago, in 1958, Dean Loussouarn noted that custom forms 
too slowly to keep up with the fast evolution of modern society.198 
Yiannopoulos echoed this notion in 1974, stating that “the formation of 
customs is too slow to cope with the growing demands of a developing 
society.”199 With the advent of computers and the internet, the world 
moves even faster today. The likelihood of an uncodified practice being 
followed for a “long time” with the belief that it is legally binding seems 
exceedingly slim in today’s world. 
CONCLUSION 
Louisiana is now too diverse and populous for any uncodified practice 
to be both repeated for a long period of time and generally accepted as 
bearing a legal obligation. The only remaining source of law Louisiana 
courts might consider to be custom is jurisprudence constante, a doctrine 
the legislature never intended to be a primary source of law.200 
Despite the Louisiana Supreme Court’s recent statements that 
jurisprudence, even when it becomes jurisprudence constante, is only a 
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persuasive source of law, some courts feel obligated to abide by the 
decisions of higher courts. Some judges have stated that the lower courts 
are “bound”201 or “constrained”202 to follow the higher courts. 
Lower courts tend to follow the decisions of higher courts for several 
reasons: (1) out of “a systemic respect for jurisprudence,” according to 
Professor Mary G. Algero of Loyola New Orleans;203 (2) because they do 
not want to be reversed or are persuaded by the higher court’s reasoning,204 
according to Merryman;205 or (3) because “they may lose prestige if they 
are seen to be inconstant” and desire “additional prestige . . . if they make 
stable law by always adhering to their decisions.”206 But courts in a civilian 
or mixed jurisdiction such as Louisiana should not feel obligated to follow 
jurisprudence simply because of a misinterpretation of outdated language 
in the Civil Code regarding custom. The time has come for the legislature 
to end the confusion by amending Civil Code articles 1 and 3 as well as 
the comments associated with those articles to remove custom as a primary 
source of law. 
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